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Leadership and Innovation

Military Ethics below the Threshold of War
C. Anthony Pfaff
ABSTRACT: The future of military ethics will be profoundly
affected by competition below the level of war. Such competition
de-emphasizes military force while expanding permissions on the
ways and means militaries employ to shape enemy interests. This
resulting new ethic will introduce norms associated with escalation,
reprisal, and risk that will increase permissible uses of force while
limiting their scope.

T

he ongoing violent exchanges between Iran, its proxies, and
the United States bring into stark relief the legal and ethical
challenges associated with the use of force below the threshold
of war. Driven by developments in technology and doctrine, state and
nonstate actors are finding more space to compete, often using military
force but avoiding an all-out war. But as the inconclusive debate regarding
the moral and legal legitimacy of the ongoing tit-for-tat exchange
between the United States and Iran continues—including the strike in
Iraq that killed dozens of Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) members, KH leader
Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds
Force Commander Qasem Soleimani—much regarding the character of
this competition is not clearly covered by the current norms of warfare.1
What stands out in the competition between the United States and
Iran is the role proxies, reprisals, and escalation management play in
the evolution of new norms. I do not mean to settle the legality of any
specific act or means. Given the paucity of law coupled with increasing
pressure to adopt nontraditional means, not enough shared norms exist
to settle such questions. I do not, therefore, offer new norms as much
as argue for a method to establish them. Of course, these means are
not new. The problem for current norms of war, however, is they either
say too little or too much. Proxies are under-regulated, allowing actors
to avoid cost and accountability. Where actors avoid accountability,
aggrieved parties have little choice but to engage in reprisals, which
are illegal in peacetime, to discourage and deter future aggressions.
Reprisals, of course, set conditions for escalation risking wider conflict
for otherwise limited ends. Avoiding the resulting lawlessness will
require proactive efforts to regulate the new environment these trends
describe. What is needed to regulate this environment is a robust
account of jus ad vim and jus in vi—much like what exists for jus ad bellum
1. Charlie Dunlap, “The Killing of General Soleimani Was Lawful Self-Defense, Not
Assassination,” Lawfire (blog), January 2020, https://sites.duke.edu/lawfire/2020/01/03/thekilling-of-general-soleimani-was-lawful-self-defense-not-assassination/; and Scott Anderson, “The
Law and Consequences of the Recent Airstrikes in Iraq,” Lawfare (blog), January 2020, https://www.
lawfareblog.com/law-and-consequences-recent-airstrikes-iraq.
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and jus in bello—to address when actors are permitted to resort to force
and what limits on such force there should be.

Jus ad Vim and the Future of Competition

Sean McFate, in The New Rules of War, writes, “conventional war
is dead.”2 In its place, he argues: “Future wars will not begin and
end; instead, they will hibernate and smolder. Occasionally, they will
explode.”3 More to the point, rather than relying on battlefield victory
to achieve their objectives, adversaries will move into the “shadows,”
where “anonymity is the weapon of choice.” 4
Just war theory and the law of armed conflict have little to say
about such anonymous means, and even where they do, international
institutions are often incapable of enforcing relevant norms. As McFate
argues, “the laws of war will fade from memory, as will the United
Nations, which will prove useless in the face of conflict.”5 He is optimistic
to believe the laws of war will fade into memory because, if for no other
reason, “lawfare” is such a critical aspect of competition—a point
he recognizes.6 What he gets right, however, is the future normative
environment will be characterized both by uncertainty on what the rules
are as well as a lack of accountability, as international institutions—not
just the United Nations—will find little leverage to regulate the behavior
of state and nonstate actors.
Determining the evolution of these norms is the purpose of jus ad
vim, a term Michael Walzer coined in 2006 when he raised the concern
that without such norms governing force below the threshold of war,
war itself would be more likely as limited attacks could set off a wider
escalation.7 Determining what those norms should be requires balancing
the norms of law enforcement, which emphasize limited force and
human rights, and warfighting, which enables wider latitude regarding
the use of force, but denies due process and places innocents at risk.
While the law enforcement model is obviously preferable, it requires
effective governance and a monopoly on the use of force. Where those
conditions do not exist, one may be permitted to loosen restrictions on
force but must at the same time avoid depressing the peacetime standard
for human rights to the war time standard.8 Thus jus ad vim will be more
permissive than jus ad bellum in permitting the use of force. Maintaining
2. Sean McFate, The New Rules of War: How America Can Win Against Russia (New York: William
Morrow, 2019), 6.
3. McFate, New Rules of War, 246.
4. McFate, New Rules of War, 246.
5. McFate, New Rules of War, 9.
6. McFate, New Rules of War, 68–69.
7. Daniel Brunstetter and Megan Braun, “From Jus ad Bellum to Jus ad Vim: Recalibrating
Our Understanding of the Moral Use of Force,” Ethics and International Affairs 27, no. 1 (February
2013): 97–98.
8. Daniel R. Brunstetter, “The Purview of State-Sponsored Violence: Law Enforcement, Just
War, and the Ethics of Limited Force,” in The Ethics of War and Peace Revisited: Moral Challenges in
an Era of Contested and Fragmented Sovereignty, ed. Daniel R. Brunstetter and Jean Vincent Holeindre
(Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2018), 235.
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the peacetime standard for rights, however, means establishing a clear
link between a proposed use of force and its effect, while tolerating little
in the way of collateral harm. These requirements further entail that
discrimination and proportionality in jus in vi will have to meet a higher
standards than its jus in bello counterparts.9 Thus, shaping the evolution
of these norms does not require a reimagining of the international order
but it will require new practices and precedents to address the challenge
that proxies, reprisals, and escalation represent.

Proxies
If anonymity is the weapon of choice then proxies are one way of
achieving it. Even when anonymity is not possible, proxies, as Iranian
reliance on them suggests, are an effective means of transferring risk
and lowering one’s costs while imposing them on others.10 From the
perspective of international law, moreover, it is difficult to hold
state actors responsible when they do employ proxies. For a state to
be accountable for a proxy’s actions, it must have “effective control”
over a proxy’s operations.11 The standard for effective control, however,
appears high. In one precedent, the International Court of Justice
found the United States had provided the contras in Nicaragua not only
with weapons but also a manual that advised them to “shoot civilians
attempting to leave a town, neutralize local judges and officials, hire
professional criminals to carry out ‘jobs,’ and provoke violence at mass
demonstrations to create ‘martyrs.’”12 The International Court of Justice
however, did not find the United States accountable for the crimes the
contras subsequently committed because no one directly associated with
an organ of the United States government directed them to commit
these crimes.
A second precedent establishing standards for effective control arises
from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s
findings regarding the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) Army’s
use of proxies against Bosnia and Herzegovina. Here they found the
FRY was responsible for the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) because the
FRY had transferred officers to serve in the VRS, paid their salaries, had
the same military objectives, provided financial and logistical support,
and “directed and supervised the activities and operations of the VRS,”
effectively giving them “overall control.”13
It is not hard to see the difficulty here. Soleimani may have provided
KH with weapons, funding, and even encouragement to attack US
forces. But given either precedent those actions do not establish
9. Brunstetter and Braun, “Jus ad Bellum,” 96–101.
10. Candace Rondeaux and David Sterman, Twenty-First Century Proxy Warfare: Confronting
Strategic Innovation in a Multipolar World (Washington, DC: New America, February 2019), 5,
https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/twenty-first-century-proxy
-warfare-confronting-strategic-innovation-multipolar-world/.
11. Oona A. Hathaway et al., “Ensuring Responsibility: Common Article 1 and State
Responsibility for Non-State Actors,” Texas Law Review 59, no. 3 (March 2017): 546.
12. Hathaway et al., “Ensuring Responsibility,” 548–9.
13. Hathaway et al., “Ensuring Responsibility,” 554–6.
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accountability. As long as he avoided giving specific instructions tied
to particular operations and maintained some organizational distance
between the Quds Force and KH, he was not legally accountable for
the actions of KH. If he was not legally accountable for their actions
then killing him was illegal, if not also unethical. The problem here is
not whether these facts regarding the relationship between the Quds
Force and KH are true; rather, the legal standard for establishing them
establishes a “perverse incentive” encouraging proxy employment while
discouraging any effort to moderate proxy behavior, since doing so could
imply effective control.14 Future norms should address this incentive.15

Reprisals
Whatever one thinks about the legality of the US air strikes targeting
Soleimani and KH leadership, attacks by Iranian proxies that provoked
them clearly broke international law. While the administration’s maximum
pressure policy has dramatically impacted the Iranian economy, it does
not justify an armed response.16 When faced with such a violation by
an adversary (Iran) and in light of unsuccessful attempts for redress or
accountability, the only resort for an aggrieved party (United States) was
to reciprocate in the form of a reprisal. In this case—the strikes against
KH and Soleimani—the United States claimed self-defense. This claim
remains very much in dispute, however, so it is still worth exploring
reprisals as an alternative justification.17
In general, reprisals permit an otherwise illegal act to compel an
adversary to conform to the law. Thus reprisals are not justified because
someone did something wrong first, but rather as a means of law
enforcement. Such uses of force must be proportionate and directed
only at those involved in the violations it is supposed to address.18 The
problem for competition is while reprisals are permitted in war time,
they are generally regarded as illegal in peacetime.19 This does not mean
one cannot use force to encourage conformity to a norm, but such use
still has to meet the standards of self-defense.20 Simply attacking back
when it is not clear any future attack is forthcoming would not meet this
standard. Absent imminence, actors are obligated to seek alternatives
before using force.
14. Hathaway et al., “Ensuring Responsibility,” 562–3.
15. See C. Anthony Pfaff, “Proxy War Ethics,” Journal of National Security Law and Policy 9, no.
2 (August 2017).
16. Rick Noack, “How U.S. Sanctions Are Paralyzing the Iranian Economy,”
Washington Post, January 10, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/01/10/
how-us-sanctions-are-paralyzing-iranian-economy/.
17. Andrew Cheung, “U.S. ‘Self-Defense’ Argument for Killing Soleimani Meets Skepticism,”
Reuters, January 3, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-blast-legal-analysis/u-sself-defense-argument-for-killing-soleimani-meets-skepticism-idUSKBN1Z301R.
18. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 5th ed.
(New York: Basic Books, 2015), 207; and Nicholas Fotion, “Reprisals,” in An Encyclopedia of War and
Ethics, ed. Donald Arthur Wells (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 410–12.
19. Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2008), 150–1.
20. Noam Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force against Non-State Actors (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2010), 10.
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The difficulty here is these alternatives are often ineffective. The
United States could have taken Iran to court for its role in the December
27 attack, but as the discussion regarding proxies indicates, it is not likely
Iran would have been held responsible. The United States could also have
tried nonviolent means to impose greater costs on Tehran, but given the
already stringent sanctions Iran is under, it is not clear this course of
action would be any more effective. This point suggests as adversaries
increasingly engage in illegal behavior, there may be room for limited
peacetime reprisals. As Walzer argues: “Reprisal is a practice carried
over from the war convention to the world of ‘peacetime,’ because it
provides an appropriately limited form of military action. It is better to
defend the limits than to try to abolish the practice.”21

Escalation
Of course, a primary reason peacetime reprisals are illegal is the risk
of escalation. Managing escalation requires having a plan for escalation
dominance prior to initiating any competitive act, violent or nonviolent.
As Herman Kahn notes, escalation dominance goes to the side that “fears
eruption the least,” or at least is the side best able to bear the cost should
the conflict escalate.22 Effective escalation management thus requires at
least three things: (1) a demonstrated willingness and capability to strike;
(2) an off-ramp that gives an adversary a less costly but acceptable option
other than continued escalation; and (3) a consensus among key allies
and partners regarding the legitimacy of one’s response.
The operative word in the first condition is “demonstrated.” It is
not sufficient that one is able to bear the cost of further violence better
than the adversary. The adversary also has to believe this to be the
case. Military capability, of course, is important to demonstrating such
capability. But it is just as important one demonstrate resolve as well.
While there are numerous ways to do this, broad international support
for one’s cause can help to underscore the strength of the commitment.
Thus, it makes sense to cultivate such support on an ongoing basis.
A good off-ramp is a clear policy statement giving the adversary
something it can do that will avoid further retaliation—an alternative
representing a lower cost than continued escalation. If conditions for
escalation termination represent existential costs to an adversary then it
has no reason not to continue the violence. Accordingly, off-ramps that
undermine an actor’s ability to govern or essentially disarm it will not
likely be effective, which is why Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s twelve
demands for Iran, including abandoning its nuclear program, ending its
development of ballistic missiles, and ceasing its use of proxies, are not
an effective off-ramp. It is not that the United States should not pursue
these goals relative to Iran. It is just that those conditions are, at least
in Tehran’s perspective, equivalent to surrender and would make then
vulnerable to regional adversaries such as Saudi Arabia.
21. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 221.
22. Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1965), 290.
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Consequently, when in an escalatory cycle, actors have to offer
something else. In this case, it seems Iran was the one who found the
off-ramp for the United States, temporarily at least. By striking back
in a way that avoided fatalities it appeared, at least, to acknowledge
the United States’ redline regarding fatal attacks on US personnel
while avoiding the appearance of backing down, which would have
likely undermined the regime’s domestic credibility. As Iran’s renewed
attacks have demonstrated, however, escalation termination is not the
same as conflict termination. In competition, sometimes the practical
if not ethical thing to do is limit violence, especially when that violence
risks harms to civilians.
Both conditions suggest the importance of ensuring international
support for one’s actions. To the extent escalation entails political
isolation, one increases one’s costs to oneself while at the same limiting
the resources available to find alternatives to continued escalation. The
former is more a practical concern but the latter is ethical. The strike
that killed Soleimani received widespread condemnation, even from
European partners.23 Given those partners’ utility in shaping Iranian
behavior, alienating them simply strengthens the Iranian position and
is thus self-defeating. The point here is not whether those partners
should have condemned the attack on Soleimani. Rather the point is,
given the uncertainty regarding how actors should respond in such
circumstances, it is worthwhile to establish in advance a set of shared
expectations regarding appropriate responses.

The Impact of Technology
Technologies such as cyber, artificial intelligence, robotics, and
additive manufacturing among others are also going to impact the
character of competition.24 In general, military innovation provides
advantage by either reducing one’s own risk or increasing it for the
enemy, preferably in ways the enemy would not expect. In reducing this
risk, technology raises a number of ethical concerns. First, as Christian
Enemark points out, the prospect of avoiding “deaths, injuries, and
grieving families,” encourages political leaders to resort to force.25
Instead of fewer lethal individual engagements, the result may be more
of them, thus creating greater risk for escalation.
Second, the proliferation of these technologies risks destabilizing the
international order. As Margaret Kosal points out, “new technological

23. “World Reacts to Killing of Iran’s Qassem Soleimani,” Euronews, January 3, 2020, https://
www.euronews.com/2020/01/03/a-declaration-of-war-and-an-escalation-the-world-reacts-tosoleimani-killing.
24. T. X. Hammes, “Cheap Technology Will Challenge U.S. Tactical Dominance,” Joint Forces
Quarterly 81, no. 2 (April 2016).
25. Christian Enemark, Armed Drones and the Ethics of War: Military Virtue in a Post-Heroic Age
(London: Routledge, 2014), 22–23.
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developments have become accessible and relatively inexpensive to
a larger number of nations and within the grasp of nonstate actors:
advanced technology is no longer the domain of the few.”26 As a result,
these technologies enable smaller actors, including nonstate actors
such as proxies Iran employs, to pursue political objectives effectively,
despite relative weakness. It also enables nonviolent coercive measures
state actors can employ as reprisals thus raising the question whether
nonlethal but indiscriminate cyberoperations, like disrupting a power
grid, be permitted when the alternative is lethal, but discriminate force.
These points suggests a moral, if not practical, obligation to regulate
the availability of these technologies.
Third, while risk of physical harm may be reduced to near zero,
the risk of psychological harms may increase and in unexpected ways.
While studies have observed mental trauma associated with autonomous
technologies, this can range unpredictably from desensitization and
moral disengagement to trauma and moral injury.27 Making matters
even more complex, a 2019 study of British drone operators suggested
environmental factors such as work hours and shift patterns were as
important, if not more so, to the experience of mental injury as visually
traumatic events associated with the strikes themselves.28 These effects
will require rethinking what counts as fulfilling ethical obligations to
one’s own soldiers and veterans.

Conclusion
It should now be apparent what the broad contours of the resulting
normative environment for competition would look like. From a
practical perspective, low-cost measures that transfer risk and avoid
attribution will proliferate, expanding targets to include those normally
proscribed by international law. From a moral perspective, employing
such measures will still be subject to conditions such as just cause,
proportionality, reasonable chance for success, and last resort.
In doing so, any resulting ethic will make coercive measures,
including the use of force, more permissive while limiting its scope. This
ethic will prioritize nonlethal over lethal alternatives, and where lethal
force is used, demand a higher standard for success and a much lower
tolerance for civilian harm. These measures represent an alternative
to war; therefore, actors will be morally required to take measures to
avoid escalation.29

26. Margaret Kosal, “Introduction,” in Disruptive and Game Changing Technologies in Modern Warfare,
ed. Margaret Kosal (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2020), 3.
27. Alaa Hijazi et al., “Psychological Dimensions of Drone Warfare,” Current Psychology 38, no.
5 (September 2017): 1–12, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-017-9684-7.
28. A. Phillips et al., “Occupational Stress in Remotely Piloted Aircraft System Operators,”
Occupational Medicine 69, no. 4 (June 2019): 244–50.
29. Brunstetter and Braun, “Jus ad Bellum,” 104.
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There is no bright line between competition and armed conflict. So
while the military, political, and economic tools available to actors yield
utility in either setting, the differences in ends competition and armed
conflict represent differences in how these tools should be used both
from a practical and ethical perspective. This last point is important.
While the ethical does not follow the practical, the practical certainly
shapes, in conjunction with a society’s values and ideals, how the ethical
gets put into practice.

